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1.1  The embodied communication perspective 
Over the last decade, embodiment has become a key concept in language, speech, and 
communication research. Converging insights have been accumulated in the cognitive 
and neurosciences indicating that communication among social partners cannot be 
reduced to the transfer of abstract information. They have revealed shortcomings of 
“classic” communication models that emphasize symbolic information transfer. Such 
models neglect the decisive role of non-symbolic information transmitted by the body 
and especially in face-to-face communication. At the same time, researchers all around 
the world have started to explore the cognitive and brain mechanisms supporting 
interpersonal action coordination. Major discoveries are being made which have impact 
on, and are fostered by, research in embodied artificial intelligence, humanoid robotics, 
and embodied human–machine communication. While the empirical evidence is rapidly 
growing, an integrative view bridging the gap between low-level, sensorimotor models 
and their role in the “social loop” and the higher-level, functional models of commu-
nicative mechanisms is lacking. 
The aim of this book is to launch and explore a new integrated and inter-
disciplinary perspective, the Embodied Communication Perspective. The embodied 
communication perspective creates a new framework to (re-)interpret empirical findings 
in the cognitive and neurosciences, and to integrate findings from different research 
fields that have explored similar topics without much crosstalk between them. At the 
same time the embodied communication perspective can serve as a guide for engineers 
who construct artificial agents and robots who should be able to interact with humans. 
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The book reflects the progress of a research year on embodied communication1 that 
took place place at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research of Bielefeld University 
(Wachsmuth and Knoblich 2005a, b). 
Why is this new perspective needed? It starts from the observation that cognition 
arose in living organisms, is inseparable from a body, and only makes sense in a body. 
Likewise, natural communication and human language developed in intimate con-
nection with body. When a person speaks, not only symbols (words, sentences, 
conventionalized gestures) are transmitted. One can indicate the size and shape of an 
object by a few hand strokes, direct attention to a referenced object by pointing or gaze, 
and modify what is being said with emotional facial expressions. Practical actions 
create affordances inviting other actors to participate in joint action, for example when 
trying to lift an object too heavy to be moved by one person (Richardson et al. 2007). 
The meanings transmitted in this way are multimodally encoded, strongly situated in the 
present context, and to a large extent expressed in bodily movements. Thus bodily 
communication is a topic of central interest for the biological, psychological, and social 
sciences because it may well be the most basic form of communication. It is likely that 
bodily communication preceded verbal communication in phylogenesis (Rizzolatti and 
Arbib 1998) and it may be the first communicative ability developing during 
ontogenesis (Tomassello and Camaioni 1997). In modern communication technology 
bodily communication has increasingly come into focus as a central aspect of intelligent 
behavior that artificial agents should be able to perform. 
Of course, the communicative function of bodily movements has long been 
addressed, for instance, in connection with rhetoric and drama. However, the last 
decades have seen rapid developments in the study of bodily communication, partly 
related to improved facilities for recording and analyzing human movements (cf. 
Allwood 2002). Pioneering work in the modern study of bodily communication was 
performed in the 1930s when Gregory Bateson filmed communication on Bali (cf. 
Lipset 1980) and in the 1950s when Carl Herman Hjortsjö (1969) started his investi-
gations of the anatomical muscular background of facial muscles, later to be completed 
by Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen (1969, 1975). Another breakthrough was Gunnar 
Johansson’s (1973) point light technique. Filming moving people dressed in black with 
                                                
1 http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ZIF/FG/2005Communication/ 
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white reflective spots on their main joints in front of a black background, he succeeded 
in isolating “pure” movement information. Further important steps using filmed data 
were taken by Michael Argyle (1975), Desmond Morris (1977), Adam Kendon (1981), 
William Condon (1986), and David McNeill (1979, 1992). Finally, in the late 1990s, 
another barrier was crossed when it became possible to study gestures using computer 
simulations in a virtual reality environment (cf. Cassell et al. 2000). For an overview of 
the whole field and its development see, for example Knapp 1978; Key 1982; 
Armstrong et al. 1995; Cassell et al. 2000. 
In previous research, bodily communication has often been considered as being 
less flexible and abstract than verbal communication. However, it seems that this is not 
necessarily the case. If one considers the descriptive framework for communication 
introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce (1902/1965) it becomes immediately clear that 
the three basic types of signs, namely, iconic, indexical, or symbolic signs are all present 
in bodily communication. An icon is a characterizing sign that carries meaning in itself 
(by being related through similarity to the information that is being shared). Showing 
the size of a ball with both hands is one example of how iconic signs are used in bodily 
communication. Indexicals point to a contextual content and, of course, have their 
origin in manual pointing gestures. Symbols (e.g. words) that require a shared social 
background, a convention, and symbolic signs in bodily communication are abundant in 
dance, sports, and everyday conversations (e.g. thumbs up, victory sign, etc.). In human 
(multimodal) communication, we normally use a combination of these three types of 
signs. 
A further important aspect of communication highlighted by the embodied 
communication approach is the purpose or function of communication. This is best 
understood in the light of competition and cooperation among members in a social 
group. One prevailing use of communication is social manipulation, that is to influence 
the behavior of conspecifics to one’s own advantage. However, communication also 
serves to establish social cohesion, and joint action coordination, that is to cooperate 
with conspecifics in achieving joint goals. A focus on the function of communication 
can create new links between the rapidly expanding research on social cognition and 
communication research. 
The embodied communication approach also stresses that reception and sharing 
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of information is not always conscious but involves a dynamic process at diverse levels 
of awareness of what is being transmitted. As mentioned above, bodily movements can 
be used to convey symbolic information, as in “OK” gestures or by signers/viewers of 
deaf sign language. However, on the most basic level bodily movements also can 
convey meaning without the use of a conventionalized code leading to a reciprocal 
understanding that is based on inhabiting similar bodies and shared action repertoires 
(Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). We may commonly assume a variation in the extent to 
which communicators are aware of what they are doing and variation regarding how 
intentional their actions are. Hence we propose a very broad definition of embodied 
communication to entail any exchange of information among members in a social group 
that depends on the presence of an expressive body and its relation to objects and other 
expressive bodies. 
Accordingly, the core claim of the Embodied Communication perspective is that 
human communication involves parallel and highly interactive couplings between 
communication partners. These couplings range from low-level systems for performing 
and understanding instrumental actions, like the mirror system, to higher systems that 
interpret symbols in a cultural context. For instance, emotions can be communicated 
through instrumental actions such as smashing a dish, words can be replaced by 
gestures and looks, and the same action can be meaningless in one culture or an 
offensive communicative act in another (e.g. spitting at the floor while engaged in a 
conversation). The challenge for the embodied communication perspective is to identify 
interpersonal couplings, to identify individual cognitive mechanisms that enable such 
couplings, and to determine how these different mechanisms get aligned to create 
shared perceptions, shared references, shared beliefs, and shared intentions. We believe 
that our attempt to face these challenges should be interesting to a wide interdisciplinary 
audience ranging from cognitive neuroscientists who are interested in identifying basic 
mechanisms of social interaction to cognitive scientists and engineers who are 
interested in modeling the human mind or constructing intelligent machines. 
In the following sections we describe the type of research contributions from the 
different fields and disciplines that set the context for the embodied communication 
perspective. Such an integrated perspective will, on the one hand, decisively advance 
our understanding of how primates (especially humans) produce, perceive, and 
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understand bodily gestures and how they utilize such gestures in order to coordinate 
their actions and exchange symbolic and non-symbolic information (Section 1.2). On 
the other hand, embodied communication is seen as a research metaphor to foster 
technology advancement in areas like anthropomorphic human–machine interfaces and 
artificial humanoid agents, such as virtual humans and humanoid robots. The cognitive 
modeling challenge is to devise theoretically grounded and empirically guided models 
that specify how mental processes and embodiment work together in communication 
(Section 1.3). 
Further important input comes from brain research in general, and social 
neuroscience, in particular. For instance, a large number of empirical findings indicate 
the crucial role of the motor system during action observation, imitation, and social 
interaction. Computational neuroscience has started to examine the parallels between 
the processes involved in controlling bodily actions and understanding observed 
actions. Moreover, it has been proposed that communicative signals might provide a 
specific context for the motor commands controlling the body (e.g. forward models 
predicting the consequences of actions in the context of social interaction; Section 1.4). 
Together, the contributions of this book reflect the embodied communication 
perspective in that communication should no longer be understood simply as an 
exchange of a series of abstract signals. Rather, it should be seen as a dynamic system 
of cross-modal attunement, decisively depending on embodiment, and constrained by 
cultural practices that structure the ways in which people interact, be it verbally or non-
verbally. An outline of the chapters is given in Section 1.5. 
 
1.2  Embodied communication in humans and other primates 
Language has long been conceived of as an isolable natural object with formal 
properties that can be investigated independently of communicative events and their 
participants. Speech has often been looked at merely as “spoken language”. However, a 
more complete and correct picture of human communication may require researchers to 
include non-verbal communication and its intimate connection to speech in social 
interaction. A good starting point to achieve this is the embodied cognition perspective 
that has advanced our understanding of individual cognition by pointing out that it is 
spread across the mind, the body, and the various artifacts located in the environment 
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(Wilson 2002; Núñez 2000; Cruse 2003). The fundamental difference between 
embodied and cognitivist perspectives lies in the role ascribed to the body, its 
characteristics, and its interactions with the environment. This emerging view is well 
articulated in a statement by A. Clark (1999, p. 506): “Biological brains are first and 
foremost the control systems for biological bodies. Biological bodies move and act in 
rich real-world surroundings.” An important implication of this view is that 
communication calls systematically on physical and biological resources beyond those 
of natural language. Thus a new understanding of communication should explain how 
living beings (and primates, in particular) produce, perceive, and understand bodily 
gestures and how they utilize such gestures in order to understand, represent, and 
coordinate their actions and how they exchange symbolic and non-symbolic 
information. 
Understanding and representing actions is closely connected with issues of 
communication and language (cf. Meggle 1997; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002). While 
traditional linguistics has tended to embrace very idealized assumptions about language, 
more recent approaches have brought the importance of deviations from this clean 
picture to the forefront. When partners in a social group cooperate, natural language is 
used face to face and it is situated in a non-verbal context. Research on situated 
communication has shed new light on the highly flexible use of language in such 
settings, its interaction with non-verbal means of communication, such as facial and 
hand gestures, and its rich grounding in visual context (Rickheit and Wachsmuth 2006). 
This has led to new insights on fundamental processes of communication, such as the 
reference to objects or their spatial relations, the coordination of speakers, the linking of 
dialog with ongoing actions, emotion and attitude, and the grounding of language in 
bodily states (Goodwin 2000; Brennan 2002, 2005; Streeck 2002; Glenberg and 
Kaschak 2003; Glenberg et al. 2005). The importance of bodily communication is 
illustrated by estimates that more than 65 percent of the information exchanged during a 
face-to-face interaction is expressed through non-verbal information in human–human 
communication (Argyle 1988) and that as much as 90 percent of speech in natural 
discourse is accompanied by gestures (Nobe 2000). 
It should be mentioned that cultural variation is considerable for most types of 
body movements. This is especially well studied with regard to facial gestures, head 
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movements, gaze, arm and hand movements, distance, spatial orientation, as well as 
touch (e.g. Heeschen et al. 1980; Grammer et al. 1988). Cross-linguistic studies have 
led to further insights about how gestures support speech (e.g. Kita and Özyürek 2003), 
and attempts are being made to set up dictionaries of the communicative gestures most 
frequently used in everyday life (e.g. Müller and Posner 2004). 
The ontogeny of gestures and intentionality are closely connected. Children 
begin to use gestures between 9 and 12 months of age. Many of these gestures originate 
from actions performed on objects and become intentional actions about objects (Bates 
et al. 1975). As Adamson (1995) notes, behaviors that accomplish other functions are 
progressively transformed into ritualized gestures. For instance, the gesture with which 
infants ask to be lifted up starts out with the infant grasping and trying to climb up the 
adult’s legs. After repeated instances—and because the adult understands what the child 
wants—the grasping and climbing behaviors are substituted by the outstretched arms 
display. Communicative gestures precede first words; when gestures and speech first 
co-occur, they are sequential, with synchronous word and gesture combinations 
emerging between 16 to 18 months of age (Iverson and Thelen 2000). Later, children 
also use gaze to infer word meanings (Baldwin 1991), and there are a number of 
developmental changes in pointing gestures that go hand in hand with the development 
of joint attention (Moore and D’Entremont 2001). 
Gesture has also been extensively studied in non-human primates (e.g. 
Tomasello et al. 1994, 1997). For instance, chimpanzees extend their arm to beg for 
food, clap their hands to raise others’ attention, and young chimpanzees touch their 
mother’s side to request transport to a different location. Gestures with tactile or 
auditory components are used independently of where the addressee is looking. In 
contrast, visual gestures, like “hand-beg”, are only used when the recipient is facing the 
actor. Some apes have learned to use pointing gestures that are not part of their natural 
behavioral repertoire to request food from humans (e.g. Call and Tomasello 1994; 
Leavens et al. 1996). Human-reared apes have also been observed to use pointing 
gestures to request things other than food (Call and Tomasello 1996). Furthermore, 
there seem to be some similarities between apes and human infants in the development 
of gestural communication (e.g. Tomasello and Camaioni 1997). It has also been argued 
(Stephan 1999) that non-human animals can intentionally use symbols to communicate, 
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at least to some extent. 
What seems to differentiate humans from all other species is the large-scale use 
of symbolic communication. But as soon as we look at spoken verbal communication 
and include intonation and bodily movements, we notice that even this type of 
interaction is not purely symbolic. Instead, there are many iconic and indexical 
elements. Therefore, traditional approaches focusing on language perception and 
production (e.g. syntactic structures, word patterns, lexical cues, phonology) appear to 
be insufficient for a complete understanding of what senders intend to communicate and 
what listeners are capable of comprehending (Clark 1996; Allwood 2002). The same is 
true for the linguistic system of sign languages (Liddell 2003; Kita et al. 1998; Duncan 
2003). Conversations are organized not by speech alone, but rather through a dynamic 
process of interaction. Both speakers and listeners are mutually involved through 
different forms of embodiment (eye gaze, gesture, posture, facial expression, etc.) in the 
organization of talk and action. 
The distribution of meaning across speech and gesture is sometimes redundant 
and sometimes complementary (Kendon 1987). Careful analyses of speech and gesture 
reveal that language is inseparable from imagery as illustrated by speech-synchronized, 
coexpressive gestures (Nobe 2000; McNeill and Duncan 2000; McNeill et al. 2002; 
Duncan 2002a). Iconic gestures appear to play a vital role in organizing imagistic 
information about complex scenes into packages that can be verbalized within single 
speech-production cycles (Kita 2000). Furthermore, prosodic cues are essential for turn-
taking and conceptual grounding, as demonstrated in computational models of turn-
taking that enable real-time predictions in dyadic interactions (Cahn and Brennan 1999; 
Brennan 2000). Additional insight into the structure of a conversation comes from 
analyzing postural mirroring between conversants (Rotondo and Boker 2003). 
Other findings have revealed forms of rhythmic organization for both the 
production and the perception of utterances. Just as the coordination of rhythmic limb 
movement (Schö ner and Kelso 1988), speech production and gesturing requires the 
coordination of a huge number of disparate biological components. When a person 
speaks, her arms, fingers, and head move in a structured temporal organization (self-
synchrony) (Condon 1986). The gesture stroke is often marked by a sudden stop that is 
closely coupled to speech, with temporal regularities observed between stressed syl-
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lables and accompanying gesture. Moreover, hearers readily pick up the rhythm behind 
a speaker’s utterances (interactional synchrony). The body of a listener, after a short 
latency following sound onset, entrains to the articulatory structure of a speaker. It has 
been claimed that there are interpersonal gestural rhythms (McClave 1994) and body 
movement may be important in interactive communication management (Davis 1982; 
Jaffe et al. 2001). Rhythm phenomena have been reported both for speech production 
(Fant and Kruckenberg 1996; Cummins and Port 1998) and perception (Martin 1972, 
1979; Pö ppel 1997). Wachsmuth (2002) has suggested that rhythmic patterns provide 
an important mechanism in intraindividual and interindividual coordination of 
multimodal utterances and that the analysis of communicative rhythm could help to 
improve human–machine interfaces. 
Pertaining to the association between body language and affective states, it has 
been suggested that attitudes such as openness and shyness are expressed through body 
movement (e.g. Argyle 1988). Darwin (1872/1965) observed long ago, across a far 
wider range of mammalian species than just the primates, that the facial expressions of 
conspecifics provide valuable cues to their likely reaction to certain courses of behavior, 
a rich complex summarized as “emotional state”. This work has had enormous impact 
and continues to do so (Ekman et al. 2003). Recent studies have suggested that motion 
carries far more information than the semantic content and that communication can 
work without involving direct cognitive processing (e.g. Grammer et al. 2002, 2003). In 
contrast, research on body posture is almost non-existent in non-verbal behavior 
analysis (see Shockley et al. 2003, for an exception), partially due to methodological 
problems (Grammer et al. 1997). 
However, the observations about the crucial role of bodily communication will 
ultimately have to be put in context with representation and content. For instance, in 
Glenberg’s (1997a, b) approach, a representation is embodied if it is constrained by how 
one’s body can move and how it can manipulate objects. This view seems to be in 
accordance with the prevailing concept of embodiment in current cognitive science 
(Feldman 1997; Ballard et al. 1997), but the assumption of an analogical structure of 
cognitive representations does not follow from the fact that cognition is somehow 
constrained by bodily features. A distinction must be made between (1) the idea that 
cognitive representations are constrained by possible bodily interactions and (2) the 
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hypothesis that these representations are analogically related to properties of the world 
(Kurthen et al. 2003). Without assuming the existence of representations that are not 
directly embodied, the use of knowledge abstracted from direct experience cannot be 
accounted for (Habel et al. 1997). 
In conclusion, body movements are an essential part of interactive face-to-face 
communication, where gestures normally are integrated with speech to form a complex 
whole (Streeck 2003). However, the integration of communicative body movements 
into a perspective that also includes speech and language requires a new understanding 
of the complex relations that exist between content and expression. This kind of 
integration is needed as a counterbalance to the traditional view that has emphasized 
writing over speech, speech over body, and symbolic over iconic and indexical 
communication (Allwood 2002). 
 
1.3  Embodied communication in machines 
A growing body of work in artificial intelligence, robotics, and agent research takes up 
questions that can be related to embodied communication in a technical way. From a 
basic research perspective, these areas can advance our understanding of key aspects of 
cognition, embodiment, and cognitive processes in communication. From an application 
perspective, they are positioned to provide well-grounded support to enable “anthro-
pomorphic” interfaces for assistance systems in many application areas. The view that 
human language crucially depends on embodiment and that this would be a major 
challenge among many other ones for creating “Intelligent Machinery” was already 
envisioned by Alan Turing (1948), in stating: “Of all the above fields the learning of 
languages would be the most impressive, since it is the most human of these activities. 
This field seems however to depend rather too much on sense organs and locomotion to 
be feasible.” 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), originally a field of the study of intelligence by 
computational theories of symbol use (overview see Wachsmuth 2000), has over the 
past decade undergone a paradigmatic shift toward the scientific study of embodied 
artificial agents in artificial life, humanoid robots, and virtual humans. In applied 
research this shift resulted in new topics of study such as perceptive or anthropomorphic 
human–machine interfaces and interface agents (e.g. Terada and Nishida 2002). These 
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efforts are complemented by the novel interface technologies for display and sensing 
becoming broadly available. These include force and position sensors, miniaturized 
cameras, touch sensitive or immersive visual displays. The first hardware platforms of 
humanoid robots have reached the edge of commercial availability, offering a basis for 
physical assistance systems in home or public environments. Interfaces are about to 
become less rigid and more integrated and are expected to revolutionize the human–
technology interface that we know today. 
The paradigmatic shift in AI also led to new research directions referred to as 
“Behavior-based AI”, “Situated AI”, or “Embodied AI”. In all of these new directions, 
agent–environment interaction, rather than disembodied and purely mental problem 
solving is considered to be the core of cognition and intelligent behavior (e.g. Agre and 
Chapman 1990; Brooks 1991a, b; Maes 1994; Agre and Rosenschein 1995; Arkin 1998; 
Pfeifer and Scheier 1999; Pfeifer and Bongard 2006). The aim is to build artificial 
agents, which interact with and adapt to new environments, previously unknown to 
them. Through their embodiment, such agents are continuously coupled to the current 
real-world situation (i.e. situated). Researchers in embodied AI and behavior-based 
robotics believe that embodiment and situatedness are also main features of natural 
intelligent agents and that they could be decisive in solving the problem of how symbols 
are grounded in sensory, non-symbolic representations (Harnad 1990). 
This new AI paradigm has also led to new types of models, as in biorobotics, 
which uses robots to model specific behavioral phenomena observed in animals (Webb 
2001). Models in the field of biorobotics generally work at a neuroethological (or in 
some cases neurophysiological) level of explanation. Notably, they are empirical, in that 
artificial neural networks are embodied in robot models that are tested under the same 
conditions that animals encounter in the real world, for example in the study of gait 
patterns in locomotion (Dean et al. 1999) or in sensorimotor control (Möller 1999). 
Another modeling approach is to construct robots that illustrate how a behavior 
observed in natural intelligent agents (e.g. to “learn” or to “imitate”) can be 
implemented. In such models, the aim is not to reproduce data that has been collected in 
a controlled environment, but rather to get a detailed understanding of a cognitive 
ability in a situated and embodied context (e.g. Pfeifer and Scheier 1997; Brooks et al. 
1998; Ritter et al. 2003; Rickheit and Wachsmuth 2006). Demonstrable by robotic 
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appearances of expressive faces, limbs and hands, efforts include the simulation of 
human-like abilities, such as attention and emotional expression (e.g. Breazeal and 
Scassellati 1999; Kleinjohann et al. 2003), imitation of grasping (e.g. Steil et al. 2004), 
and the development of protolanguage (Billard 2002; Billard et al. 2004). 
A further important issue in embodied AI is the empirical study of language 
evolution by way of synthetic modeling approaches with both robotic and simulated 
agents (Steels 1997a, 2000). As Steels and Vogt (1997) argue, robots need to be 
equipped with at least basic communication abilities in order to move on from agents 
that can solve basic spatial tasks, such as object avoidance and navigation, towards 
agents that could be said to exhibit “cognition”. These abilities must be developed 
bottom-up by the agents themselves, and the communicated concepts as well as the 
means of communication must be grounded in the sensorimotor experiences of the robot 
(Steels 1997b). This way, robots can be used to study the origins of language and 
meaning in self-organization and coevolution (Steels 1998a). A number of experiments 
were carried out with robotic and software agents to study the emergence of reference 
and meaning (Steels 1996a), lexicon (Steels 1996b, 1997c), and syntax (Steels 1998b). 
An attempt to study communication in (predesigned, largely controlled) 
simulated environments is undertaken in virtual humans research. Researchers across a 
wide range of disciplines have begun to work together toward the goal of building 
virtual humans (Gratch et al. 2002)—also known as “embodied conversational agents” 
(Cassell et al. 2000) or “perceptive animated interfaces” (Cole et al. 2003). These are 
software entities that look and act like people and can engage in conversation and 
collaborative tasks in virtual reality. Clearly such an agent does not have a body in the 
physical sense (cf. Becker 2003), but it can be equipped with a synthetic voice, verbal 
conversational abilities, visual and touch sensors, etc., and employ its virtual body to 
express non-linguistic qualities such as gesture and mimicked emotions. The focus of 
virtual human research is on capturing the richness and dynamics of human 
communication behavior, and its potential applications are considerable. A variety of 
applications are already in progress in the domains of education and training, therapy, 
marketing, and virtual reality construction (e.g. Johnson et al. 2000; Marsella et al. 
2000; André et al. 2000; Kopp et al. 2003). 
By engaging in face-to-face conversation, conveying emotion and personality, 
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and otherwise interacting with the synthetic environment, virtual humans impose fairly 
severe behavioral requirements on the underlying animation system that must render 
their virtual bodies. Animation techniques must span a variety of body systems: 
locomotion, gestures, hand movements, body pose, faces, eyes, gaze, and speech. 
Research in human figure animation has addressed all of these issues (e.g. Badler et al. 
1993; Terzopoulos and Waters 1993; Tolani et al. 2000). But at a more fine-grained 
level, it is necessary to determine the specific spatial and temporal relations among 
modalities, with timing emerging as a central concern. For instance, speech-related 
gestures must closely follow the voice cadence (Cassell et al. 2001; Wachsmuth and 
Kopp 2002). First attempts have been made to integrate these multimodal behaviors in 
computer-animated human models with sufficient articulation and motion generators to 
effect both gross and subtle movements with visual acceptability and real-time 
responsiveness (Kopp and Wachsmuth 2004). A related technical effort is to assemble 
software tools and to reach interface standards that will allow researchers to build on 
each other’s work (Gratch et al. 2002). 
A research challenge at the heart of the study of embodied communication is 
imitation of non-verbal behaviors such as gestures demonstrated by a human inter-
locutor (Kopp et al. 2004a). For instance, gestural movements derived from imagistic 
representations in working memory must be transformed into patterns of control signals 
executed by motor systems (Kopp et al. 2004b). Another research challenge is emotion, 
that is can a virtual human express emotions related to internal parameters that are 
driven by external and internal events. In communication-driven approaches, a facial 
expression is deliberately chosen on the basis of its desired impact on the user (e.g. 
Poggi and Pelachaud 2000). In contrast, simulation-based approaches view emotions as 
arising from an agent’s valenced reaction to events and objects in the light of goals (e.g. 
Becker et al. 2004), where the current emotional states of the agent are communicated 
by consistent facial expression, intonation, and further behavioral parameters. 
The realization of synthetic agents engaging in natural dialog has drawn atten-
tion to questions on how to model social aspects of conversational behavior in mixed-
initiative dialog, in particular, feedback signals and turn-taking, a basic interactive 
mechanism for scheduling the speaker role in conversation. Whereas conversation 
analysis has emphasized the context-free and rule-based character of this mechanism 
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(Sacks et al. 1974), empirical studies by Duncan (1974) and successors have 
documented the role of interactive signals for the negotiation of the speaker role. Both 
aspects are reflected in theories that emphasize the interactive character of dialog (e.g. 
Goodwin 1981; Clark 1996). In this line, the work by Thórisson (1997, 1999, 2002) and 
Cassell (Cassell et al. 1998) has paved the way for computational models of turn-taking 
in human–machine communication. 
In summary, the design of human–machine interactions with robotic agents and 
virtual humans is of great heuristic value in the study of communication because it 
allows researchers to isolate, implement, and test essential properties of interagent 
communications. Creating artificial systems that reproduce certain aspects of a natural 
system can help to understand the internal mechanisms that have led to the particular 
results. Such modeling should draw both on cognitive and brain research. It should 
include approaches to simulate behaviors and processes in neuroinformatics as well as 
artificial intelligence approaches that address a wide range of functions supporting 
communication, ranging from bodily action to language. 
 
1.4  The role of basic social interaction in embodied communication 
In the past, there has hardly been any crosstalk between action research and com-
munication research. However, new findings in the domain of social cognition suggest 
that many primates (including humans) are equipped with basic functions for social 
interaction that reside in the perception action system. This raises the question of 
whether more sophisticated forms of verbal communication are grounded in basic 
sensorimotor loops for social interaction that serve to understand and predict 
conspecifics’ behavior and support basic action coordination. 
Ideomotor theories (e.g. Jeannerod 1999; Prinz 1997) claim that the specific 
actions of others can selectively affect one’s own actions, as observed in mimicry 
(Chartrand and Bargh 1999), priming (Wegner and Bargh 1998), and imitation (Brass et 
al. 1999; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Prinz and Meltzoff 2002). According to these theories, 
actions are coded in terms of the perceptual events resulting from them. Observing an 
event that regularly resulted from one’s own actions induces a tendency to carry out this 
action. Thus it is assumed that perceiving events produced by others’ actions activate 
the same representational structures that govern one’s own planning and control of these 
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actions. Further findings provide evidence that actions at the disposal of another agent 
are represented and have an impact on one’s own actions, even when the task at hand 
does not require taking the actions of another person into account (Sebanz et al. 2006, 
2003). These and other results (e.g. Barresi and Moore 1996; Shiffrar and Pinto 2002) 
suggest that social interactions depend on a close link between perception and action. 
Ideomotor theories have gained strong empirical support from neuroscience 
through the finding of “mirror neurons”. These neurons do not only fire when a monkey 
performs a particular goal-directed action but also when a monkey observe another 
monkey or the experimenter perform a similar action (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti and 
Arbib 1998; Gallese 2003). The idea of a direct perception action match is further 
supported by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies in humans. Several areas, such as premotor cortex (Iacoboni 
et al. 1999; Rizzolatti et al. 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), posterior parietal 
cortex (Ruby and Decety 2001), and the cerebellum (Grossman et al. 2000), are 
activated when an action is imagined or carried out as well as when the same action is 
observed in others (Blakemore and Decety 2001; Grèzes and Decety 2001). Further 
neuroimaging and magnetic stimulation studies have shown that areas associated with 
action are also active during imitation (Fadiga et al. 1995, 2002; Iacoboni et al. 1999; 
Grèzes et al. 2001). Premotor systems are also activated when subjects view 
manipulable tools (e.g. Grafton et al. 1997; Weisberg et al. 2007) or action verbs (e.g. 
Hauk et al. 2004). The finding of mirror systems suggests that we don’t necessarily 
need conventional sign systems in order to get aligned with others. Mirroring seems to 
provide a mechanism that allows us to understand others’ actions by matching them to 
our own action repertoire. 
Another important mechanism for motor control that could have implications for 
embodied communication is the real time simulation of action (e.g. Kawato et al. 1987; 
Miall and Wolpert 1996; Jeannerod 2001; Wolpert and Flanagan 2001). It is now well 
established that forward models predict the sensory and perceptual consequences of 
one’s own actions in order to compensate for the time that it takes for the reafferences 
to arrive in the central nervous systems. More recent is the proposal that others’ actions 
can be predicted using the same forward models that are used to predict the 
consequences of own actions once the mirror system has established a match between 
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the observed action and one’s own action repertoire (Wilson and Knoblich 2005). Such 
predictions could ensure that one stays aligned with the actions others will perform 
during joint action, particularly when precise timing is important (Knoblich and Jordan 
2002, 2003). It has also been speculated that similar processes support alignment during 
verbal discourse (Pickering and Garrod 2007). 
Learning by imitation is another essential part of human motor behavior that 
could be crucial for embodied communication and seems very limited in other primates, 
even chimpanzees (Tomasello et al. 2005). Although seemingly a trivial “copying” task, 
learning by imitation poses a series of computational challenges including: (i) how to 
map the perceptual variables (e.g. visual and auditory input) into corresponding motor 
variables; (ii) how to compensate for the difference in the physical properties and 
control capability of the demonstrator and imitator; and (iii) how to understand the 
intention of action from observation of the resulting movements (Schaal et al. 2003). 
This illustrates that, although imitation may use mirroring mechanisms, mirroring is not 
sufficient to explain imitation. Arbib (2005) emphasizes that the evolution of 
communication may have crucially hinged on an extension of the mirror system that 
supported the complex imitation abilities found in humans. Such an extension could 
also have provided a basis for the development of gestural pantomime and the gradual 
development of a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures that ultimately led 
to the evolution of a language-ready brain. 
Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato (2003) have explored the parallels between the 
computations that occur in motor control and in action observation, imitation, and social 
interaction. In particular, they have examined the extent to which motor commands 
acting on the body can be equated with communicative signals acting on other people 
and suggest that computational solutions evolved for motor control in natural organisms 
may have been extended to the domain of social interaction. 
According to Wolpert and colleagues (2003) social interaction involves that an 
actor generating motor commands causes communicative signals which, when 
perceived by another person, can cause changes in their internal states that in turn can 
lead to actions which are perceived by the actor. The authors suggest that their approach 
to action understanding provides an efficient mechanism for performing the 
computations needed in social interaction that may contribute to a theory of mind that is 
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based on difference modeling between one’s own and others’ internal states. From a 
philosophical perspective, it has been speculated that observed action, together with the 
simulation component of action memory, forms a major building block for an 
understanding of other minds (Proust 2000). Under a representationalist analysis, this 
process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-
relation itself and, once in place, could later function as a building block for social 
cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of a first-
person perspective (Gallese and Metzinger 2003; Metzinger and Gallese 2003). 
Further insights come from clinical studies on communication disorders on 
patients with aphasia (i.e. the loss of power of expressing or of comprehending 
language, e.g. Ahlsén 1991) and apraxia (i.e. the loss of the ability to carry out 
purposeful movements, e.g. Rose and Douglas 2003; Goldenberg 2001; Goldenberg et 
al. 2003). Parkinson’s disease also causes decrements in motor outputs—including 
speech and general motor systems—that also lead to a reduction in spontaneous 
gesturing during interactive communication (Duncan 2002b). Thus studying verbal and 
non-verbal communication in different patient groups may help to illuminate the 
architecture of the human communication device. 
To conclude, including the contributions of perceptual and motor systems in the 
study of embodied communication is likely to help us establish the urgently needed 
links between research on social cognition in primates and cognitive and traditional 
language research. This should also allow us to better understand to what extent basic 
sensorimotor functions are reused and reshaped to enable a wide variety of 
communicative behaviors. 
 
1.5  Outline of contents 
Bringing together a selection of articles from the cognitive and neurosciences as well as 
the computer sciences, this book aims to develop the new perspective of embodied 
communication. The 18 chapters to follow focus on several aspects of embodied 
communication to elaborate a comprehensive understanding of the processes that give 
rise to the exchange of information by verbal and, in particular, non-verbal means. 
The first eight chapters address basic sensorimotor, cognitive, and brain 
mechanisms that enable the social couplings between humans that are crucial for any 
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form of social interaction and discuss the evolutionary forces behind these mechanisms. 
In Chapter 2 “Some boundary conditions on embodied agents sharing a common 
world”, John Barresi defines some general constraints that any embodied agent, human 
or machine, must meet in order to effectively work together with other agents of the 
same kind. He starts with the observation that such agents will have personal worlds 
that are characterized through relations with the environment that embody the agent’s 
purposes (intentional relations). “Common worlds” between agents emerge when their 
personal worlds overlap or interact. Barresi applies his framework to a number of 
findings from research on evolution and child development. He also proposes a thought 
experiment involving a robot community (the “Cyberiad”) to illustrate his framework. 
He points out that this framework should be understood as an attempt to develop a 
common language that captures basic principles of social life. 
The “wild systems” approach Jerome Scott Jordan proposes in Chapter 3 
“Toward a theory of embodied communication” is similarly ambitious. The funda-
mental assumption here is that organisms need to be understood as systems that survive 
through energy transformations. In this perspective cognition and communication are 
functions that are enabled by a dynamical control system. Each layer of this 
hierarchically organized system embodies aspects of the contexts organisms need to 
survive in, at different scales. Meaning, in this approach, is conceptualized as 
“embodied aboutness” and thus tightly linked to function. Communication is 
conceptualized as a special case of control where organisms jointly gain control over 
the environment. This is a provocative proposal because it treats intentionality as 
primary and knowledge as secondary, the reverse of what traditional cognitive science 
theories suggest. 
In Chapter 4 “Synchrony and swing in conversation: Coordination, temporal 
dynamics and communication”, Daniel Richardson, Rick Dale, and Kevin Shockley 
provide an overview of their empirical research on interpersonal synchrony during 
conversation. This research is guided by the assumption that there is a continuum 
between thinking and action and that higher-level cognition is tightly linked to 
perception and action. One way to test this claim is to look at the temporal alignment of 
people’s body movements and eye movements while they converse. The authors 
introduce a new method (recurrence analysis) that they have used to study such 
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temporal alignments. The results of their studies make a very strong point for the notion 
of embodied communication. Hearing each other speak is sufficient to make 
conversation partners move in a similar rhythm and mutual understanding is improved 
when their eyes are temporally aligned in scanning the same objects in a scene. 
Chapter 5 “The visual perception of dynamic body language”, by Maggie 
Shiffrar, addresses the perceptual processes enabling us to derive cues from movements 
that support basic forms of emotional and intentional understanding. The human brain is 
without doubt an organ of a social organism. Maggie Shiffrar shows that visual social 
information derived from others’ movements is indeed processed in a different way as 
non-social information derived from movements. She further shows that visual 
processing is affected by the similarity of motion representations in the observer and the 
observed actor. Thus the human visual system seems not to be a general-purpose 
processor but an inherently social organ that allows people to read the bodily expression 
of others with ease in their daily lives. 
A look at “mirrors for embodied communication” is taken by Wolfgang Prinz in 
Chapter 6. He starts with a discussion of the manifold cultural uses for mirrors: they 
provide means for people to perceive themselves in new ways and in different 
perspectives. He then shows how the mirror metaphor can be used to describe mental 
functions and representations (“mirrors inside”) as well as social functions that 
constrain people’s actions (“mirrors outside”), and applies these metaphors to a wide 
range of phenomena that are of central interest to cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists alike. In his view, the mirror metaphor will not only help us to 
understand how people mimic each other, imitate each other, and engage in joint action. 
It also provides a way to explain how people create a sense of self for themselves that 
“is tantamount to creating a homunculus” within their own body. 
In Chapter 7 “The role of the mirror system in embodied communication”, 
Natalie Sebanz and Günther Knoblich discuss which aspects of embodied commu-
nication mirroring mechanisms can explain and which aspects they cannot explain. 
They start with an overview of the recent empirical evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience that leaves few doubts that while observing others we “recreate” their 
actions, emotions, and sensations in our own minds. Mirroring creates a basic social 
link that helps us to understand others, to predict what they will do next, and to create 
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emotional bonds with them. However, Sebanz and Knoblich also point out that it is 
important to recognize the limits of mirroring. More sophisticated social interactions 
that involve imitation, joint attention, joint action, mind reading, or verbal 
communication require additional cognitive mechanisms. However, it seems likely that 
these additional mechanisms interact and make use of the powerful mirroring 
machinery that is already in place in monkeys.  
Like the human body, the human mind was shaped by evolutionary constraints 
and requirements. In Chapter 8 “Everything is movement: on the nature of embodied 
communication”, Elisabeth Oberzaucher and Karl Grammer interpret the ability of 
humans to analyze other people’s body language as a tool to identify honest signaling 
and to detect cheaters. They present empirical studies on motion quality and the 
expressiveness of body motions demonstrating that body language is not easily 
disguised. The difficulty to suppress expressive motion signals makes them enormously 
valuable as veridical cues to what others feel and intend and is indeed intensively 
analyzed by human communication partners. These observations lead the authors to a 
multilayered dynamic model of communication going beyond the traditional “ping-
pong” theories of signaling. 
Nature is a great toolbox for engineers and so is the communicative behavior of 
living beings. In Chapter 9 “Communication and cooperation in living beings and 
artificial agents”, Achim Stephan, Manuela Lenzen, Josep Call, and Matthias Uhl 
compare the communicative and cooperative behaviors of living and artificial beings. In 
their view, highlighting similarities and differences between these behaviors will help 
us to better understand the phenomenon of communication and embodiment in 
communication in general. They present a fine-grained typology of the very diverse and 
complex ways in which living beings communicate and cooperate and then apply these 
distinctions to artificial agents. A large amount of cooperation, as it turns out, is 
possible without intentional communication. Complex forms of cooperation needing 
communication involve a social dimension that is mostly absent in artificial beings. 
Finally, they discuss whether artificial beings will ever develop genuine understanding. 
Six further chapters discuss how thoughts, intentions, and bodily gestures are integrated 
during embodied communication to form a close, multilayered coupling between 
communication partners. To begin, Chapter 10 “Laborious intersubjectivity: Attentional 
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struggle and embodied communication in an auto-shop” by Jürgen Streeck shows how 
fine-grained speech and bodily signaling interact in an every-day discourse. Using the 
methodology of microethnography Streeck analyzes a tiny dialogue in an auto-shop. In 
his view, there is neither a single mechanism nor an automatic procedure responsible for 
achieving intersubjectivity. Rather, intersubjectivity emerges out of a heterogeneity of 
bodily mechanisms, practices, and resources. The communication partners use them in a 
flexible way that develops during their conversation. Achieving intersubjectivity works 
not only from “the inside out”, that is by using oneself as a model for the other but also 
from “the outside in”, by visually attending to one’s own gestures and how they are 
registered by the other. 
In Chapter 11 “The emergence of embodied communication in artificial agents 
and humans”, Bruno Galantucci and Luc Steels propose a genuinely interdisciplinary 
approach for studying the emergence of sign systems. This is one of the relatively rare 
cases where research in cognitive psychology and computer science converged, 
although the researchers did not even know of each other’s work. Inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, Galantucci and Steels assume that the evo-
lution of communication was tightly linked to solving practical problems in particular 
environments and in real time. Steels studies, in experiments involving multiple robots, 
how the need for coordination in such practical social interactions can attach meaning to 
arbitrary symbols and how it can generate abstract syntactical structures. Galantucci 
studies the same question in humans in a controlled laboratory setting where 
participants have to invent new ways of communicating because all conventional 
channels are cut. Both lines of research provide exciting new evidence that abstract 
communication can emerge from concrete, practical interactions. 
Chapter 12 “Dimensions of embodied communication—Towards a typology of 
embodied communication”, by Jens Allwood, discusses how various types of content, 
function, and organizational features of communication are embodied. He stresses that 
even though new research areas are characterized by a certain fluidity of researchers’ 
concepts, it is important to strive for definitional clarity. Then he analyzes the concepts 
“embodiment”, “body”, and “communication”. Based on this analysis he develops an 
extensive agenda of what could and should be included in embodied communication 
research, concluding that there is no overwhelming risk that embodied communication 
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research will run out of work in the near future. 
Turning to application, Chapter 13 “Neurological disorders of embodied 
communication”, by Elisabeth Ahlsén, analyzes whether findings and hypotheses on 
embodied communication may be useful for clinical diagnosis and the treatment of 
communication disorders like aphasia. After reviewing relevant theories and findings 
from embodied cognition research, she discusses the shortcomings of classical clinical 
frameworks on communication disorders. Then she shows in the light of concrete 
examples what it would mean to take embodiment issues into consideration when 
dealing with patients with communication disorders. Finally Ahlsén discusses a new 
model of “embodied communication disorders”. 
Chapter 14 “Gestural imagery and cohesion in normal and impaired discourse”, 
by Susan Duncan, focuses on errors that are not predicted by formalist models of 
language production and that support the assumption that language production is an 
embodied cognitive process. The analyses of speech and coverbal gestures presented in 
this chapter draw on videotaped stories told by healthy individuals and by individuals 
with Parkinson’s disease. Unrehearsed storytelling performances of both speaker groups 
are examined and compared for evidence that coverbal gestures may function as 
embodied representations of meaning that help build and maintain cohesive storylines. 
Duncan concludes that this line of research could contribute to reconsider the modu-
larist, amodal symbol manipulation models of human language use that have dominated 
psycholinguistic research for decades. 
In Chapter 15 “Conversational metacognition”, Joëlle Proust sets out to create a 
link between embodied communication and psychological and philosophical theories of 
metacognition. To establish this link she provides a general definition of metacognition 
that covers not only assessing and monitoring the cognitive adequacy of one’s own 
information processing performance (the classical definition), but also assessing and 
monitoring one’s “conversational adequacy”. She then proceeds to describe a number of 
metacognitive gestures that can be understood as being distributed over the 
conversation partners and as ensuring joint control over the interactions that take place 
during a conversation. This allows her to define metacognitive functions in conversation 
and to demonstrate that the functions of conversational metacognition can neither be 
reduced to mirroring mechanisms nor to theory of mind mechanisms. The chapter ends 
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with discussing the implications of the proposal for conceptualizing cooperation and 
defection. 
The last four chapters explicitly turn to the computational modeling of 
communicative behavior. In Chapter 16 “Imitation in embodied communication—from 
monkey mirror neurons to artificial humans”, Stefan Kopp, Ipke Wachsmuth, James 
Bonaiuto, and Michael Arbib approach the roles imitation plays in embodied 
communication from two different directions. The “mirror system” of the macaque 
brain is looked at in the first approach, assessing models of neurons, which are active 
both when the monkey performs a particular instrumental action, and when the monkey 
sees another monkey or a human executing a similar action. In the second approach, a 
“virtual human” is studied to make computationally explicit the ways in which enabling 
an artificial agent to imitate can help it attain better capabilities of communicating with 
humans. Both these efforts then serve to discuss the role of imitation, its underlying 
functions and mechanisms in communicative behavior as well as in building a general 
theory of embodiment, which could both advance our understanding of human 
communication and patterns of communication between humans and future robots. 
Gesturing is an essential feature of lively communication that is often admired in 
humans and not often seen in artificial agents. But what exactly is the role of gestures? 
In Chapter 17 “Persuasion and the expressivity of gestures in humans and machines”, 
Isabella Poggi and Catherine Pelachaud analyze how gestures can make a discourse 
more persuasive. After an overview of the history of gesture research and studies on the 
expressivity of gestures from antiquity onwards they present a model of persuasive 
discourse in terms of goals and beliefs. They illustrate their model using case studies on 
the gestural behavior of famous politicians. Finally, they discuss how such a model can 
be used to implement persuasive gesturing in an embodied conversational agent. 
Computer simulations of multimodal behavior are an increasingly popular 
method to test and to refine cognitive models of language production. Chapter 18 
“Implementing a non-modular theory of language production in an embodied 
conversational agent”, by Timo Sowa, Stefan Kopp, Susan Duncan, David McNeill, and 
Ipke Wachsmuth, assesses which aspects of McNeill’s Growth Point theory of language 
production can be implemented in an artificial agent. So far such agents have been 
largely based on assumptions borrowed from modularist views of speech production. 
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Focusing on the model architectures of two communicative agents, the authors contrast 
these views with the assumptions and implications of Growth Point theory and outline 
how some of these could be modeled computationally. They discuss which commu-
nicative advances can be expected for conversational agents that conform to Growth 
Point theory and, more generally, how predictive computational models of language and 
gesture production can further the cognitive modeling of multimodal behavior. 
Finally, Chapter 19 “Towards a neurocognitive model of turn-taking in 
multimodal dialogue”, by James Bonaiuto and Kristinn Thórisson, seeks to investigate 
hierarchically organized actions in communication. One essential, but often overlooked, 
feature of natural dialogue is turn-taking. The seemingly simple human ability to 
smoothly take turns while communicating becomes obvious in its complexity when one 
tries to teach turn-taking to artificial agents. Bonaiuto and Thórisson assume that turn-
taking during conversation exists primarily for the purpose of helping participants to 
reduce cognitive load during conversation. They develop a hybrid cognitive model of 
turn-taking enhanced with a detailed, neural model of action selection. Then they 
present experiments demonstrating how turn taking emerges in this model. It turns out 
that their hybrid model, with little or no overlap in speech, is able to learn turn-taking 
and to process “social” turn-taking cues. 
The authors and the editors hope that this volume will stimulate further 
discussion and that it will inspire research that further enriches the embodied 
communication perspective: to identify individual cognitive mechanisms that enable 
interpersonal couplings and to determine how these different mechanisms get aligned to 
create shared perceptions, shared references, shared beliefs, and shared intentions. They 
also hope that the detailed study of modeling issues will lead to novel ideas advancing 
work on anthropomorphic human–machine interfaces and artificial humanoid agents.1 
Finally, they hope that the embodied communication perspective will help to boost joint 
research and improved communication between the various disciplines involved. 
 
 
 
                                                
1 A related book is published as: Modeling Communication with Robots and Virtual 
Humans (I. Wachsmuth, G. Knoblich, eds.,), Berlin, Springer, April 2008. 
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